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Abstract
This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior
worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied
up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model
has two important features. First, the manager has more information about a
junior’s ability than the junior himself. Second, the junior’s effort and ability
are complements. We show that the manager has an incentive to exaggerate the
junior’s ability. We discuss two ways in which the manager can make credible
statements about the junior’s ability. First, the senior can delegate a task to the
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junior for which it is important that the junior has a correct perception of his
ability. Information is shared through a costless signal. Second, the senior can
spend more time on a junior she perceives as able than on a junior she perceives
as less able. Information is then shared through a costly signal.
Keywords: Communication, incentives, signalling, overconfidence, delegation,
collaboration
JEL codes: C70, D23, D83
1 Introduction
Motivating colleagues is an important role of superiors. When analyzing this role,
economists tend to focus on monetary incentives and rewards.1 Consequently, the
multi-faceted relationship between superior and subordinate is often reduced to a con-
tractual one. In particular, verbal communication is by and large ignored although it
is likely to take place on a daily basis and aims at exerting influence on a subordinate’s
attitude and at inspiring desirable behaviour. In this paper, we analyse under what
conditions verbal communication motivates, and explain why communication is often
connected with organizational choices, such as job enlargement and collaboration.
A few examples illustrate what we intend to capture. In 2003, the governing board
of the Dutch Central Bank explicitly formulated its view on the role of managers
in a document entitled ‘Management Competencies’.2 In this view, managers are
supposed to motivate subordinates by acting as a mentor. Managers should challenge
subordinates by delegating tasks, taking into account the risk for the Bank. Moreover,
managers should be able to assess the abilities of their subordinates and assign tasks
and responsibilities accordingly.3
1For a survey see, e.g., Prendergast (1999).
2‘Managementcompetenties’ in Dutch.
3Monetary rewards are also used to motivate at the Dutch Central Bank. The extent to which a
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Managers at the Dutch Ministry of Finance are required to follow management
courses. In these courses, the manager is viewed as a coach. These courses pay sub-
stantial attention to subjects like attention, perception and delegation. Finally, a
cursory examination of various MBA programmes suggests that in these programmes
discussions of communication, persuasion, and leadership are at least as common as
analyses of compensation schemes.4
To analyse the possibilities and limits of communication as a means of motivating,
we present a model in which an agent (‘he’) designs a project that is then submitted
to the principal (‘she’) who decides whether to implement it or not. Both the principal
and the agent care about the success of the project. We assume that the principal
has a better assessment of the agent’s ability to design a successful project than the
agent himself. One can think of the principal as an experienced manager or head of
department who is responsible for ensuring that the agent contributes to the organi-
zation. Their relationship could be one of supervision, as when the agent is a newly
recruited employee like a management trainee. But one could equally well think of an
experienced (associate) professor and an assistant professor.
Although it is an essential feature of our model that the principal has better in-
formation than the agent, we do not want to claim that this is always the case. For
example, when an experienced agent gets to a new job that is very similar to his pre-
vious one, he has probably a more accurate view of his ability than his new principal.
However, when the agent is young, his self-assessment is based on limited professional
experience, if any, while his principal may have much experience of assessing young
agents. Thus, our model typically describes situations in which the agent is at the
manager’s daily interactions with subordinates provide testimony to the desired competencies has an
influence on the manager’s bonus (Job Swank, personal communication).
4We had a look at the courses offered at Wharton School of Business, Chicago Graduate School of
Business, Harvard Business School, Rotterdam School of Management, and London Business School.
2
beginning of his career or performs tasks for the first time, while the principal has had
experience with a number of similar agents. For this reason we refer to the agent as
the ‘junior’ and to the principal as the ‘senior’.
Another important feature of our model is that a junior’s effort depends positively
on his belief that he is able: ability and effort are complements. In particular, the more
able is a junior, the higher is the likelihood that his effort leads to a good project. An
implication is that the senior, having an interest in a good result, has an incentive to
make the junior believe he is able. That is, once the senior has formed an impression
of the junior that is not all too favourable, she cannot escape exaggerating his ability.
However, the junior sees through the senior’s intentions and rationally discounts the
senior’s claim. In our model this discounting induces the junior to ignore statements
made by the senior. Thus, communication alone does not motivate. It is merely cheap
talk.
Although the senior cannot be withheld from making exaggerated claims so as to
boost the agent’s confidence in his ability, a priori she would have preferred to commit
herself to truthfully revealing her assessment. The extra effort of the more able junior
and the concomitant increased likelihood of a good project more than outweighs the
reduction in effort stemming from the realisation that one is not as able as initially
thought. That is, truthfully reporting what the senior knows about the junior’s ability
leads to the first best situation. By exaggerating in case of a relatively bad impression,
she destroys the possibility of convincingly claiming a truly favourable assessment. In
our model, then, stimulating self-confidence prevents the creation of self-knowledge.
We analyse two organizational choices that can be interpreted as ways of making
communication credible. The first is job enlargement through delegation of authority.
By this we mean that the junior is allowed to both design the project and to decide
on its future. By claiming to delegate only if the senior’s assessment is favourable, the
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temptation is to delegate also in case of a less favourable impression of the junior’s
ability as this would stimulate effort. We refer to this increase in effort as the motiva-
tion effect. However, exaggerating the junior’s ability also causes him to become too
confident when it comes to project implementation. Thinking he is more able than he
really is, and therefore that a project is more likely to be successful than it actually
will be, a project is implemented under conditions the senior would have discarded
it. This negative effect could be called the ‘overconfidence effect’ of exaggeration. If
this effect dominates the motivation effect, the senior is not tempted to exaggerate the
perceived ability of the junior. In this situation, delegation enables credible communi-
cation. Moreover, it does so at no costs. The first best can be attained because of the
presence of costs that are latent and that only become manifest in case of delegating
to a less able junior.
Our model of delegation describes how senior medical specialists supervise their
students. In many countries, training as a medical specialist is received by means of
hospital internships under the supervision of senior specialists. Seniors are generally
much better able to assess their students’ skills than the students themselves. The
students infer information about their abilities from the way the senior delegates tasks.
A student who is only allowed to perform simple operations will conclude that he is less
able than a student who is allowed to perform more complicated operations. When
deciding whether or not to delegate a specific treatment to a student, the senior is
aware that her decision affects the student’s perception of his abilities.
A second way in which communication can be made credible is by having the senior
selectively dedicate time and attention to the design of the project or to the junior
himself. The senior may be able to truthfully reveal her information, by engaging
herself in the design phase only if she has a favourable impression of the junior’s
ability to develop a successful project. As Mintzberg (1971) found in his empirical
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analysis of managerial work, this engagement can take on various forms. The senior
may forward to the junior useful information she obtains from peers or other parts of the
organization; she may ensure the junior can work in an especially pleasant environment
and provide encouragement; she can inform interested parties of the project that is
under development and thereby create a more productive environment in which to
design the project; and obviously she can spend time and effort on the design of the
project herself - e.g. preparatory, supervisory or collaborative effort.5
We modify our base model by introducing the possibility that the senior’s effort
affects the likelihood of success of the project. The junior’s effort is still a prerequisite
for possible project success. From the productive point of view, i.e. barring communi-
cation problems, she would help more if she has a favourable impression of the junior
than a bad one, because in the former case her effort is more likely to be productive
than in the latter. The temptation for the senior is once again to make a junior of
whom she has an unfavourable impression believe she in fact thinks he is very able
by being as collaborative as in case of a positive assessment. What may prevent the
senior from giving in to this temptation are the costs of time and effort that would be
exceedingly high in comparison with the increase in the likelihood of successful project
design. The larger the difference between the effort levels from a productive point
of view in case of a favourable and an unfavourable assessment, the more likely it is
that this temptation does not exist. However, if this difference is too small, credible
communication requires more effort in case the junior is truly thought to be able. This
distorts the effort decisions in case of a favourable assessment. The senior becomes too
engaged, e.g. by overly pampering the junior or by putting him under excessive stress.
As a result, the latter also dedicates too much time to project development. Similarly,
5The various forms of engagement are described by Mintzberg (1971) as roles. Here we refer to
the role of disseminator of information and as a liaison figure, leadership, spokesman, and resource
allocator, respectively.
5
if the senior’s effort does not directly influence the likelihood of success of the project
but amounts to providing attention to the junior, its discriminatory use can work as a
credible signal.
Our paper contributes to the voluminous literature on organizational design. This
literature deals with a wide variety of issues, such as the debate about centraliza-
tion versus decentralization, the allocation of tasks and responsibilities, and problems
concerning communicating and processing information, to mention a few. The liter-
ature focusing on the relationship between the assignment of tasks and communica-
tion emphasizes the way in which task assignment influences the nature and amount
of communication between departments to attain a desirable organizational outcome
(e.g. Marschak and Radner 1972) and stresses the desirability of hierarchical struc-
tures from a communication and information processing point of view (e.g. Calvo and
Wellisz 1978, Garicano 2000). We differ from either line of research. A distinguishing
feature of our approach is that the assignment of tasks makes communication possible
in the first place rather than that it influences the total cost of communication or the
speed with which a final decision is reached. Of course, we are aware that the allocation
of tasks also has important implications for collecting and processing information.
More specifically, our paper is related to studies describing situations in which a
principal has more information about a key aspect of the production process than an
agent. One of those studies is Benabou and Tirole (2002), which, like ours, analyzes
a model in which a senior has better information about the junior’s ability than the
junior himself, and effort and ability are complements. Concerning delegation and col-
laboration, the focus of their analysis is on how the senior’s decision whether or not
to delegate a task (or whether or not to collaborate) affects a worker’s perception of
himself, and in turn influences his effort. Unlike us, Benabou and Tirole assume that
a sorting condition holds. This sorting condition guarantees that the junior can infer
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information about his ability from the senior’s decision to delegate or to collaborate.
Our focus is on the conditions under which delegation and collaboration can be used
as a means of communicating information about the junior’s ability. We show that
through her decision about the allocation of tasks, a senior can sometimes reveal in-
formation. We thus offer a new rationale for delegation and collaboration.6 Our model
of collaboration is in spirit most similar to Hermalin’s (1998) model of leadership. In
that model, one worker in a team, the leader, has better information about the benefits
of a common project. The leader cannot share the information with the other workers
through ordinary talk. Hermalin shows how a leader can signal her information by
exerting costly effort. Like us, he focuses on the characteristics of the equilibrium in
which credible communication takes place. An advantage of our approach over Her-
malin’s and Benabou and Tirole’s is that it yields predictions about the circumstances
under which a senior chooses delegation or collaboration as a means of revealing her
information about the junior’s ability.
We find that communication through delegation requires that the senior has a fairly
accurate view of the junior’s ability. The reason is that when a senior is quite certain
that the junior is not able, overconfidence constitutes a major risk. Consequently, a
senior who accurately assesses a junior’s ability has hardly an incentive to delegate the
decision about the project to a junior she assesses not able. In case the senior does
not have an accurate view of the junior’s ability, delegation does not work as a means
of communication. The benefits of higher effort levels exceed the costs arising from
overconfidence. In that case, attention (or collaboration) as a means of communication
usually remains possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the base com-
6There are other reasons for delegation, such as a better utilization of information at low levels of
hierarchies. Delegation may also induce agents to exert more effort (see e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997;
Za´bojnik, 2002).
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munication model which we analyse in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the conditions
under which delegation makes credible communication possible. Then, in section 5, we
analyse the circumstances under which collaboration overcomes the senior’s credibility
problem. Section 6 discusses the role attention can play. Section 7 concludes. Proofs
can be found in the appendix.
2 The Base Communication Model
Consider a situation where two tasks have to be performed. The first task is the design
of a project. The second task is to decide whether to implement the project, X = 1, or
not, X = 0. The task of designing a project is delegated to a risk-neutral individual to
which we refer as the junior (‘he’). A designed project is either of good or bad quality.
The probability that a junior designs a good project depends on his ability, a. The
junior can be smart or dumb, a ∈ {SM,DU}. The prior probability with which the
junior thinks he is smart equals η. A smart junior differs from a dumb one in that
the effort the former puts in the design of a project increases the probability that the
project is good, while a dumb agent always designs a bad project, irrespective of the
effort he exerts. The probability that a smart agent designs a good project is denoted
by pi (e), where e denotes effort. We assume that pi (0) = 0, pi′ > 0 and pi′′ ≤ 0. The
junior is effort averse. The costs of effort are represented by c (e), with c (0) = 0, c′ > 0,
and c′′ > 0.
Once the project has been designed, a decision has to be taken on the project. In
the base model, we assume that the junior’s superior (senior, ‘she’) takes this decision.
Whether or not the project should be implemented depends on the quality of the
project and on the state of the world. If the project is good, then the project yields
a payoff to the junior and his senior equal to p + f + µ, with f > 0. If the project is
bad, it yields a payoff equal to p+µ. After a project has been designed, Nature draws
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µ from a uniform distribution with support [−h, h]. Both the junior and his senior
observe µ. A good (bad) project should be implemented if p+ f + µ > 0 (p+ µ > 0).
We assume that p+ f − h < 0 and p+ h > 0. The implication of these assumptions is
that the decision about the project should depend on the realization of µ.7
The senior receives a noisy signal s = {sm, du} about the junior’s ability. With
probability β, the signal is fully informative, that is Pr(a = SM | s = sm, info) = 1
and Pr(a = DU | s = du, info) = 1. With probability 1−β, the signal is uninformative:
Pr(a = SM | s = sm, uninfo) = η and Pr(a = DU | s = du, uninfo) = 1−η. The senior
does not know whether the signal is informative or not, but does know the value of β.
Thus, γsm = Pr (a = SM |s = sm) = β + (1− β) η and γdu = Pr (a = SM |s = du) =
(1− β) η. For β > 0 we have that γsm > η > γdu. As the junior does not know the
signal s his senior received, the senior can be of two types s. The junior does know
the accuracy β of the signal. After the senior has received her signal, but before the
junior designs a project, the senior sends a message m to the junior. The message is
either m = sm, meaning ‘I have received a signal s = sm’, or m = du, meaning ‘I have
received a signal s = du’.
7Our assumption that, apart from costs, the payoff of the junior and the senior are identical is not
material for the nature of our results. It would be sufficient for the payoffs to be positively correlated.
What is essential is that both junior and senior are motivated by the fruits of their work - either
because of an intrinsic interest in their accomplishments or as a way of improving their (individual)
lot in the future.
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Table 1 The Base Communication Game
Players: junior and senior
Sequence of the game
• Nature chooses the ability of junior, a ∈ {DU,SM}. With probability η, a = SM
and with probability (1− η), a = DU .
• The senior receives a signal s ∈ {du, sm} about a: Pr (a = SM | s = sm) = γsm
> η and Pr (a = SM | s = du) = γdu < η.
• The senior sends a message about her signal to the junior: m ∈ {du, sm}.
• junior chooses effort e ≥ 0 at cost c (e) and designs a project.
• If a = SM , then the expected benefit of the project equals p+f with probability
pi (e) and p with probability 1 − pi (e). If a = DU , then the expected benefit of
the project equals p.
• Nature draws µ from a uniform distribution function with µ ∈ [−h, h]. µ is
revealed to both the junior and the senior.
• The senior takes a decision on the project, X ∈ {0, 1}.
Payoffs:
• junior: U(X = 0) = −c (e); U(X = 1 |Good project) = p + f + µ − c(e);
U(X = 1 | bad project) = p+ µ− c(e).
• Superior: U(X = 0) = 0; U(X = 1 |Good project) = p + f + µ; U(X = 1 | bad
project) = p+ µ.
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In the next section we characterize the two-period perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
This amounts to a strategy for the junior that is optimal given his belief about the
type of senior; a strategy for either type of senior that is optimal given the strategy of
the junior and the strategy of the other type of senior; and a belief held by the junior
about the type of senior that is consistent with the senior’s type-dependent strategies.
In our game, the senior’s message is a costless, nonverifiable claim; it is cheap talk. It
is well-known that in cheap-talk games, a babbling equilibrium always exists. In such
an equilibrium, the sender of the message randomly chooses a message and the receiver
ignores the message. Clearly, these strategies are optimal responses to each other. In
this paper, we ignore the babbling equilibrium.
3 Analyzing the Base Model
In this section, we make the point that the senior cannot avoid exaggerating the per-
ceived ability of the junior, i.e., she cannot avoid sending m = sm, ‘I have received a
signal s = sm’, if in reality s = du. The intuition is the following. Suppose the junior
believes the senior truthfully reveals her information. Then, by sending a message
m = sm rather than m = du, the senior enhances the junior’s confidence in his ability,
which in turn increases the marginal revenue of his effort. We call this the ‘motivation
effect’ of the message. The junior understands this temptation and therefore ignores
the message m = sm and instead bases his effort decision on his prior belief η about
his ability.
To solve our game, first consider the implementation decision. Conditional on the
senior having received signal s, implementation of the project yields a higher payoff
than maintaining status quo if
γspi (e) (p+ f + µ) + [1− γspi (e)] (p+ µ) > 0 (1)
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Clearly, the senior implements the project if µ > µs (e), where
µs (e) = −p− γspi (e) f (2)
To ensure that the implementation decision is important we assume:
Assumption 1 | µs (e) |< h for s ∈ {du, sm}
Let us now consider the problem the junior faces. The junior determines how
much effort to put in designing a project as a function of the message m the senior
sends. In making this decision, the junior anticipates that the senior will make the
implementation decision on the basis of Eq (2). Suppose the junior believes that the
senior truthfully reveals her information, i.e., a senior of type s sends message m = s.
Consistent with this strategy of both types of senior is the junior’s belief that s = m,
so that
e∗m = argmaxe Pr (µ > µm (e))E (p+ γmpi (e) f + µ|µ > µm (es))− c (e)
= argmax
e
Pr (µ > µm (e))
(
−µm (e) + 1
2
(h+ µm (e))
)
− c (e)
= argmax
e
1
4h
(p+ h+ γmpi (e) f)
2 − c (e) (3)
Consequently, in case of an interior solution, e∗m satisfies the first-order condition
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1
2h
pi′ (e) γmf (p+ h+ γmpi (e) f) = c′(e) (4)
We assume that in case s = sm such an interior solution exists:
Assumption 2 If the junior believes that the senior truthfully reveals her information,
then, in case of s = sm, 1
2h
pi′ (0) γsmf (p+ h+ γsmpi (0) f) > c′ (0) such that e∗sm > 0.
8The second-order condition is: 12hpi
′′ (e) γmf (p+ h+ γmpi (e) f) + 12h (pi
′ (e))2 γ2mf2 − c′′ (e) < 0.
Throughout, it is assumed that this condition is satisfied.
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The following lemma results from application of the implicit function theorem to Eq
(4).
Lemma 1 Suppose the junior believes the senior, i.e., m = s. Then e∗sm > e
∗
du. More-
over, for given m, the junior’s effort is increasing in p, f , γdu, γsm and a decreasing
function of h.
The intuition behind the results presented in Lemma 1 is as follows. If the junior
believes the senior’s announcement, then the message m = sm rather than m = du
increases the likelihood that the junior is smart and that therefore his effort will be
likely productive. As a result, the junior exerts more effort. Effort increases with
f , p, γsm and γdu as f is the potential benefit of effort, and a rise in p, γsm or γdu
increases the probability that the fruits of effort can be reaped. A rise in h implies
that the realization of µ becomes more important for the implementation decision.
The implication is that the gain of effort relatively decreases. An increase in h thus
decreases effort.
Still assuming that the junior believes that the senior truthfully reveals her infor-
mation, the senior’s payoff if she receives signal s and sends message m = s becomes
1
4h
(h+ p+ γspi (e
∗
m) f)
2 (5)
It immediately follows that the senior has an incentive to exaggerate the ability of the
junior (i.e, tell m = sm in case s = du). Of course, a direct implication is that the
junior will ignore the senior’s message. The message does not contain any information
about the junior’s ability.
Lemma 2 In the base communication game, a separating equilibrium in which the
senior truthfully reveals her information does not exist.
In the remainder of this paper we will focus on situations in which the senior’s
incentive to exaggerate the junior’s ability is a problem in the sense that ex ante, the
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senior would benefit from always telling the truth. The reason that the senior wants
to share her information is that the junior would exert more effort in case it were most
likely to be productive (s = sm). This raises the question whether the organization
of work can be adapted so that the senior can credibly convey information about
the junior’s ability. In the next two sections we analyse two ways in which credible
communication can take place. In Section 4, we analyse how delegating the decision to
implement the project to the junior may allow the senior to signal her information. In
Section 5, we turn to the possibility of collaboration between the senior and the junior
in the project design stage as a means of communication.
4 Delegation of the Implementation Decision
In this section, we extend the base model by giving the senior the opportunity to
delegate the implementation decision to the junior. Formally, the senior can choose
D = 1 (D = 0), meaning that the junior (senior) will make the decision on the project.
The senior’s delegation decision is observed by the junior and takes place after the
senior received signal s, but before the junior chooses effort. We assume that the
senior cannot renege on her delegation decision. That is, if she chooses D = 1, it is the
junior who in fact makes the implementation decision. We focus on the case in which
delegation of the implementation decision (D = 1) means “junior, my assessment is
you are smart with probability γsm”, and not delegating (D = 0) means “junior, my
assessment is you are smart with probability γdu”. With little loss of generality we
assume that the delegation decision automatically implies m = sm (m = du). In other
words, the senior communicates by delegating.9
The following proposition gives the condition under which delegation of the imple-
9The only implication is that we do not have to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs when
(D = 1,m = du) or (D = 0,m = sm).
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mentation decision solves the senior’s credibility problem.
Proposition 1 If
1
4h
(p+ h+ pi (e∗du) γduf)
2 >
1
2h
(p+ h+ pi (e∗sm) γsmf)
(
p+ pi (e∗sm) γduf +
1
2
(h− p− pi (e∗sm) γsmf)
)
(6)
then a separating equilibrium exists, in which the senior chooses D = 1 if s = sm, and
D = 0 if s = du; The project is implemented if and only if
µ > −p− pi (e∗s) γsfwith s ∈ {du, sm} (7)
where e∗s solves
1
2h
pi′ (es) γsf [p+ h+ pi (es) γsf ] = c′(es) (8)
The junior’s beliefs are Pr (s = sm | D = 1) = 1 and Pr (s = du | D = 0) = 1.
Eq (6) gives the condition under which the senior has no incentive to delegate
the implementaton decision to the junior when s = du. The left hand side gives the
senior’s payoff if she does not delegate the implementation decision to the junior. The
right hand side gives the payoffs that would result from delegating the implementation
decision to the junior. The costs and benefits of delegation to a junior in case of
s = du can be seen from the right hand side. Delegation would lead the junior to
hold an exaggerated belief in his ability. This gives rise to an increase in effort from
e∗du to e
∗
sm. This captures the motivation effect of exaggerating ability. However, the
implementation decision would now also be based on an inflated belief in the junior’s
ability. The junior would be too confident that the project will be successful and
would therefore implement the project in situations in which the senior would reject
the project. This overconfidence effect can be seen from the use of γsm rather than γdu
in the probability of implementation, Pr (µ > −p− pi (e∗sm) γsmf) = p+h+pi(e
∗
sm)γsmf
2h
, and
in the expected value of µ of a project that is implemented, 1
2
(h− p− pi (e∗sm) γsmf).
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It follows from Eq (6) that if the senior’s signal is highly accurate, delegation of
the implementation decision works as a credible communication device. For β = 1,
γsm = β + (1− β) η = 1 and γdu = (1− β) η = 0. Then, Eq (6) amounts to
1
4h
(p+ h)2 >
1
4h
(p+ h+ pi (e∗sm) f) (p+ h− pi (e∗sm) f) (9)
which generally holds true. By continuity of e∗sm and e
∗
du in β this inequality also holds
for sufficiently large values of β.
Figure 1: The motivation effect and the overconfidence effect and their net result on
the incentives to delegate in case of s = du (c(e) = 1
2
e2, pi(e) = e, p = 0, h = 1, f = 0.6
and η = 0.5).
Figure 1 illustrates how the motivation effect and the overconfidence effect together
determine whether delegation can be used as a communication device. It is drawn
under the assumption that the cost function is given by c (e) = 1
2
e2 and that pi(e) = e.
Furthermore, we have assumed that p = 0, h = 1, f = 0.6 and η = 0.5.10 Three pairs
10One can readily check that for these parameter values the senior would ex ante prefer a separating
equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium.
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of lines are shown. First, the figure shows the optimal effort levels e∗sm and e
∗
du exerted
by a junior who believes he is smart with probability γsm and γdu, respectively. For
completely uninformative signals, β = 0, these effort levels are identical. The difference
in effort grows with any improvement in signal accuracy, and it becomes maximal for
β = 1. If a junior believes he is smart with probability γdu = 0, he does not exert
any effort at all. It is this difference in effort levels the senior is tempted to exploit
by delegating the decision to implement the project to the junior if in fact her signal
is s = du. This gap in effort levels therefore captures the motivation effect. The
overconfidence effect can be seen from the difference in probability of acceptance of
the project, Pr (µ > µsm (e
∗
sm)) > Pr (µ > µdu (e
∗
sm)). If the senior has received signal
s = du and if the junior has exerted e∗sm effort, the correct probability of acceptance is
Pr (µ > µdu (e
∗
sm)). However, by delegating the implementation decision to the junior,
the latter thinks he is smart with probability γsm, and this in turn gives rise to too
large a probability of acceptance. The net result of the motivation and overconfidence
effect is captured by the third pair of lines. Both are drawn conditional on s = du.
The line labelled Π (D = 1) shows the senior’s payoffs in case she delegates the decision
to implement to the junior, whereas the one labelled Π (D = 0) depicts payoffs if the
senior makes the implement decision herself. For low values of β > 0 the senior cannot
withstand the temptation to delegate as she benefits more from the motivation effect
than the overconfidence effect hurts her. For large values of β, the overconfidence effect
is known to be too strong, and therefore Π (D = 0) > Π(D = 1).
The upshot is that the presence of latent costs that would only become manifest
in case the senior were to delegate the implementation decision when s = du make
communication about the junior’s ability possible. Recall that the base communication
game is a cheap talk game in which no separating equilibrium exists due to the fact
that the junior’s costs of effort do not enter the senior’s utility function. In that
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situation, if the junior believes the senior’s announcement, no costs can withhold the
senior from claiming that s = sm. However, delegating the implementation decision
to a junior when s = du would hurt the senior. If these costs are large enough, the
senior is no longer tempted to exaggerate the junior’s ability. Interestingly, the latent
nature of these costs is sufficient to withhold the senior from exaggerating. Delegation
is therefore a costless, non-verbal signal. Accordingly, if Eq (6) holds, the first best
solution is attained. That is, for given value of s, both the effort levels and the project
implementation decisions are optimal.
Proposition 2 If a separating equilibrium exists (i.e., if Eq (6) holds), the senior’s
information is costlessly signalled, and the effort levels are first best.
Apart from the signalling reason, it does not matter who makes the implementation
decision in our model. In many situations, however, it is likely that less experienced
persons make more mistakes. In the context of our model this would mean that for
given level of effort, delegation of the implementation decision to a junior increases
the probability of a wrong implementation decision. The introduction of this aspect
into our model has two effects. First, it makes delegation a less attractive device
for improving communication between the senior and the junior. The benefit of a
separating equilibrium must exceed the cost of more mistakes. Second, conditional on
the senior preferring a separating equilibrium to a pooling one, the fact that a junior
is an inferior decision maker widens the range of parameters for which a separating
equilibrium exists. The reason is that it weakens the senior’s incentive to delegate the
implementation decision to a junior in case of s = du.11 This is important as it is this
incentive that makes communication between the senior and the junior hard.
Let us conclude this section with a remark. Organizations tend to have a document,
11The expression at the right hand side of the inequality in Eq (6) decreases, making it more likely
that the condition holds.
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like a manual of authority, that details how authority is delegated to positions within
the organization. It does so by specifying what someone because of his or her position
or office in the organization is allowed to decide on, how much money may maximally be
involved depending on whether the outlays should be expensed or capitalised etc. From
a communication perspective, our findings point to the fact that rulebound delegation
complicates credible communication as it leaves little room for managerial discretion
whether to delegate a task or not. In this respect, our paper is related to Simon (1951),
who pointed out that a typical employment contract does not specify exactly what the
employee should do. The rationale we provide differs from the one given by Simon.
He focused on the advantage of postponing decision making such that the uncertain
future can unfold.
5 Collaboration
In the introduction we mentioned various ways in which managers may dedicate time
and attention to the design of the project or to the subordinate himself. One could
imagine that part of this time directly improves the likelihood of success through
‘collaboration’, whereas the remaining part consists of, say, ‘attention’ that is not
directly productive but that may nevertheless be used to signal valuable information
about the senior’s view concerning the quality of the junior. Attention can take on the
form of, for instance, the provision of verbal (re-)assurance, invitations to meetings,
and sharing of organizational gossip.
This section and the next deal with the question whether the senior can convey
information about the junior’s ability by collaborating with the junior or dedicating
attention to him. We extend our base communication game by giving the senior the
opportunity to dedicate either form of time. Let eB stand for the total amount of
time dedicated to the project by the senior, of which αeB refers to collaboration and
19
(1− α) eB denotes attention. We maintain the assumption that when the junior is
dumb, a = DU , the project is always bad, regardless of the effort the junior and/or the
senior put in designing a project. A necessary condition for a good project therefore
remains that the junior is smart, a = SM . Thus, if a = SM , then by collaborating
with the junior, the senior increases the probability that the junior designs a good
project. We assume that the senior expends effort before the junior, or that she can
commit herself to an effort level. The probability that a good project is designed if a
junior is smart, a = SM , equals pi
(
eJ , αeB
)
where eJ stands for the effort exerted by
the junior.12 We assume that piJ > 0, piB > 0, and piJB ≥ 0, where subscripts refer
to partial derivatives. Costs of effort are convex for both senior, C
(
eB
)
, and junior,
c
(
eJ
)
. To allow for the possibility that the senior’s collaborative effort comes over and
above his other duties, we assume C (0) ≥ 0 and C ′ (0) ≥ 0. The payoff to the senior
equals the revenue of the project, if implemented, minus the cost of her effort. In this
section we analyse the case where all effort exerted by the senior is collaborative, α = 1.
In Section 6, we turn to the situation in which she limits herself to paying attention,
α = 0.
Our basic game had no separating equilibrium as it involved a cheap talk game in
which players’ interests differed too much. As a result, the junior did not learn the
signal received by the senior. Does the extended game have a separating equilibrium?
A necessary condition for a separating equilibrium of the extended game is that the
senior’s effort level depends on her type: the messages the senior sends can now be
identified with the effort levels chosen. Let eBsm and e
B
du denote the senior’s equilibrium
effort levels when she received signal s = sm and s = du, respectively. Roughly
speaking,13 as the senior’s effort is to no avail when a = DU , in a separating equilibrium
we must have that eBsm > e
B
du. Beliefs the junior holds regarding the information the
12We assume that the parameters are such that in any equilibrium 0 < pi
(
eJ , αeB
)
< 1.
13We make this statement precise in Lemma 4.
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senior has concerning his ability are ‘s = sm’ if eB ≥ eBsm and ‘s = du’ if eB < eBsm.
The last condition for a separating equilibrium is that a senior with signal s = du does
not have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of a senior with signal s = sm.
We proceed as follows. In Subsection 5.1, we characterize the junior’s effort level
and the effort levels of both types of the senior assuming that when the junior makes
his effort decision he knows the senior’s type. Then we check whether the senior’s
effort levels satisfy the separating condition. Finally we turn to the question what the
senior could do when the effort levels do no prevent him from exaggerating a junior’s
ability. As this subsection is based on general functional forms, we only derive implicit
statements for equilibrium effort levels. To gain further insight, we turn to a special
case in Subsection 5.2.
5.1 Characterizing Equilibria
We start by assuming that the junior knows the senior’s type, i.e., by assuming the
junior believes the senior’s message. When the senior makes his decision about the
project, implementation yields an expected payoff equal to p+γspi(e
J
s , e
B
s )f +µ, where
eJs denotes the junior’s effort conditional on the senior’s type s. We write e
B
s to highlight
that the effort level eB signals type s. Implementation yields a higher payoff than
maintaining the status quo if µ > µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
)
= −p− γspi
(
eJs , e
B
s
)
f .
The junior knows the senior’s effort when determining his effort and anticipates the
senior’s decision rule. Expected project revenue when the junior decides how much
effort to exert equals
R
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)
= Pr
(
µ > µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
))
E
(
p+ γspi
(
eJs , e
B
s
)
f + µ|µ > µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
))
= Pr
(
µ > µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
))(
−µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
)
+
1
2
(
h+ µs
(
eJs , e
B
s
)))
(10)
=
(
p+ h+ γspi
(
eJs , e
B
s
)
f
)2
4h
(11)
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The junior’s best response, conditional on the senior’s type s, eJs
(
eBs
)
, results from
maximizing R
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)
− c
(
eJs
)
. An interior solution satisfies14
RJ
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)
− c′
(
eJs
)
= 0 (12)
Two features of the best response eJs
(
eBs
)
that is implicitly defined by Eq (12) are
worth noting. First, in case eJs
(
eBs
)
> 0, higher levels of the senior’s effort lead to
higher levels of the junior’s effort. Eq (10) and the expression for µs show why. The
probability of acceptance as well as the expected payoff conditional on acceptance rise
in effort, whether exerted by the junior or by the senior. Because we assumed that
piJB ≥ 0, it follows that if the senior’s effort increases, the marginal revenue of the
junior’s effort rises. Second, for eJs
(
eBs
)
> 0 with s ∈ {sm, du}, the larger is the
likelihood γs that the junior is smart, the larger is the marginal productivity of effort,
and therefore the more effort the junior exerts for a given level of the senior’s effort.
In particular, eJsm
(
eBs
)
> eJdu
(
eBs
)
for all eBs .
Lemma 3 Suppose that the junior knows the senior’s type, and suppose eJs
(
eBs
)
> 0
for s ∈ {sm, du}. Then (i) the junior’s effort is increasing in the senior’s effort;
and (ii) the junior’s effort is increasing in the probability that he is smart, implying
eJsm
(
eBs
)
> eJdu
(
eBs
)
for all eBs .
Now consider the effort decision the senior has to make. The senior takes into ac-
count the effect her choice has on the junior’s effort level. That is, the senior maximizes
R
(
eJs
(
eBs
)
, eBs ; s
)
− C
(
eBs
)
, for s ∈ {sm, du} (13)
and so the first order condition for an interior solution becomes
RJ
(
eJs
(
eBs
)
, eBs ; s
) deJs
deBs
+RB
(
eJs
(
eBs
)
, eBs ; s
)
= C ′
(
eBs
)
(14)
14We assume that the second order condition RJJ
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)− c′′ (eJs ) < 0 holds.
22
Because the senior undertakes a host of activities, it may well be that collaborating
with the junior is too expensive or not rewarding enough. In that case the senior does
not exert any effort if she is of type s as
RJ
(
eJs (0) , 0; s
) deJs
deBs
+RB
(
eJs (0) , 0; s
)
≤ C ′ (0) (15)
Let
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
denote the pair of effort levels such that e∗Bs satisfies either Eq (14) or
(15) for s. If
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
> 0, the question becomes whether the senior exerts more
effort in case of s = sm or in case of s = du. Clearly, as the marginal revenue of effort
of both the junior and the senior increase in the perceived ability of the junior, the
answer to this question hinges on the way γs influences de
J
s /de
B
s . To guarantee that
a senior who is more confident to collaborate with a smart junior exerts more effort
than in case she were less confident, we impose a mild restriction on the way deJs /de
B
s
changes with an increase in γ. Lemma 4 states that as long as piJJ is not ‘too negative’,
e∗Bsm > e
∗B
du . Hence, the more able the senior believes the junior to be, the more effort
she exerts.
Lemma 4 Suppose an interior solution e∗Bsm exists for s = sm. Suppose piJJ is not too
negative. Then, e∗Bsm > e
∗B
du .
To highlight the fact that
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
has been derived ignoring any separating condition
and looking only at the productive side of the senior’s effort, we refer to these levels as
‘productive effort levels’. These effort levels
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
reveal the senior’s type if they
are such that the senior has no incentive to choose e∗Bsm when her type is s = du. In
other words, the pair
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
is part of a separating equilibrium if it satisfies the
separating condition
R
(
eJdu
(
eBdu
)
, eBdu; du
)
− C
(
eBdu
)
≥ R
(
eJsm
(
eBsm
)
, eBsm; du
)
− C
(
eBsm
)
(16)
where R
(
eJsm
(
eBsm
)
, eBsm; du
)
stands for the revenue the senior obtains when s = du
and bases her implementation decision on γdu rather than γsm, but signals s = sm
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by exerting eBsm effort. Obviously, if e
∗B
sm = e
∗B
du = 0, the separating condition is not
satisfied. Define e∗Js := e
J
s
(
e∗Bs
)
for s ∈ {sm, du}.
Proposition 3 Let e∗Bs solve Eq (14) or (15) for s ∈ {du, sm}. If the pair
(
e∗Bsm, e
∗B
du
)
satisfies the separating condition (16) then it is part of a separating equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the junior believes that s = sm if and only if eB ≥ e∗Bsm, and exerts effort(
e∗Jsm, e
∗J
du
)
. In any other case (i.e., e∗Bsm > 0 but condition (16) is violated, or e
∗B
sm = 0),
e∗Bsm and e
∗B
du are not part of a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3 states that if condition (16) holds the junior learns the senior’s type.
Important for this result is that time spent on a junior in case of a favourable assessment
is more productive than in case of a less favourable assessment. A direct implication
is that it is costly for the senior to make exaggerated claims as to the junior’s ability.
The separation condition is satisfied, if the costs of mimicking exceed the benefits.
What if the productive effort levels
(
e∗Bdu , e
∗B
sm
)
do not satisfy the separation condi-
tion? As in Section 3, the senior’s problem is that she then would like to make any
junior believe that her assessment is s = sm. As a result, a junior observing e∗Bsm does
not believe that the senior really assesses her favourably. As usual in signalling models,
the senior can make her message about her type credible by sending a costly message.
In our model, this amounts to exerting that level of effort that ensures that mimicking
if s = du is not beneficial. Hence, if s = sm, the senior exerts effort, êBsm so that
Condition (16) holds with equality (with e∗Bdu resulting from either Eq (14) or (15)).
Given êBsm and e
∗B
du , the junior believes that the senior’s signal is s = sm if and only if
eB ≥ êBsm. The last condition for a separating equilibrium is that êBsm (with separating)
yields a higher payoff than e∗Bsm (inducing the junior to believe that the senior’s type is
s = du, while it is in fact s = sm).
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5.2 Analyzing Equilibrium Behaviour
In this subsection we analyse a special case to shed light on the way key parameters
influence the possibility of communication. We restrict our model in two ways. First,
we consider a linear function pi
(
eJ , eB
)
= eJ + eB. Second, we assume that the costs
of effort are quadratic: for the junior, c(eJ) = 1
2
λeJ2, with λ > 0, and for the senior
C
(
eB
)
= 1
2
λB
(
eB + Ω
)2
, with λB > 0 and Ω > 0.
Assume that the junior believes the senior’s signal. The junior’s best response
function becomes (see Eq (12)):
eJs
(
eBs
)
=
(p+ h) γsf
2hλ− γ2sf 2
+
γsf
2hλ− γ2sf 2
eBs
= As +Bse
B
s , s ∈ {sm, du} (17)
with As = (p+ h) γsf/ (2hλ− γ2sf 2), Bs = γsf/ (2hλ− γ2sf 2), and where 2hλ−γ2sf 2 >
0 because of the second order condition for a maximum. In particular, even if the
senior were not to exert any effort, the junior would. Observe that the junior’s effort is
increasing in the effort exerted by the senior. Also note that, for a given level of effort
of the senior, the more the junior believes being smart, the higher is his effort. Both
statements follow from Lemma 3.
The senior takes this best response function into account when maximizing his
payoff net of cost. Her objective function becomes
1
4h
(
p+ h+ γsfAs + γsf (1 +Bs) e
B
s
)2 − 1
2
λB
(
eBs + Ω
)2
(18)
The senior maximizes expression (18), with respect to eBs , subject to e
B
s ≥ 0. This
yields the productive effort levels
e∗Bs =

∆s
2hλB−γ2sf2(1+Bs)2
if ∆s > 0
0 if ∆s ≤ 0
(19)
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where ∆s = (1 + Bs) γs (p+ h+ γsfAs) f − 2hλBΩ.15 It is immediately clear that if
e∗Bsm > 0, then e
∗B
sm > e
∗B
du , as implied by lemma 4.
We now analyse how the accuracy β of the senior’s assessment of the junior’s ability
influences optimal effort levels. The senior does not exert effort if she knows that her
effort is very unlikely to pay off. If the senior’s signal accurately reveals the junior’s
ability, β = 1, and the signal equals s = du, then γdu = 0. The marginal benefits of
effort are therefore nil, whereas the marginal costs of effort equal at least λBΩ. Under
such circumstances, the senior does not exert effort. Define β as the value of β ∈ [0, 1)
such that ∆du = 0. Then for sufficiently trustworthy information, β ≥ β, the optimal
level of effort in case of s = du equals eBdu = 0. As we illustrate below, β is not
necessarily ‘close’ to one.
Lemma 5 Suppose the junior believes that the senior tells the truth, s = m. For
β ≥ β, with β < 1, the senior does not exert effort if s = du, eBdu = 0.
Of course, effort should be sufficiently beneficial to be exerted even in case of a
good signal, s = sm. The lower is the possible upside f in case of a good project, the
smaller is the set of parameters for which the senior exerts effort, both in case s = du
and s = sm. Similarly, the higher are the cost of exerting effort, λB and/or Ω, the
smaller is the set of parameters for which effort is exerted.
Our game revolves around the senior’s inclination to exaggerate the junior’s quality.
An important factor that determines this inclination is the degree of signal accuracy
β through its effect on γsm and γdu. Assume that for β = 0, e
∗B
sm > 0. It follows from
Eq (19) that e∗Bsm increases in β. The reason is that the higher is the probability that
the junior is smart, the higher is the expected marginal revenue of the senior’s effort.
The effect of β on e∗Bdu , by contrast, is negative until β = β. We have seen that for
15The denominator in the expression for eBs if ∆s > 0, 2hλB − γ2mf2 (1 +Bm)2, is positive by the
second order condition for a maximum.
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values of β ≥ β it equals zero. The spread of e∗Bsm and e∗Bdu thus increases in β. A direct
implication is that also the costs of mimicking increases in β.
The benefit of exaggerating the ability of a junior is the concomitant increase in the
junior’s level of effort because of the change in belief he holds about his quality. The
higher is β the larger is this increase. However, any increase in β implies a reduction
in the likelihood that this additional effort will in fact be productive. When β = 1,
there are no benefits of mimicking.
More generally, the above discussion implies that there is a value β̂ ∈ [0, 1) such
that for β ≥ β̂ the senior truthfully reveals what she knows about the junior as the
benefits of mimicking fall short of the cost of the extra effort the senior would have to
exert. If, however, β ∈ [0, β̂], the only way to avoid exaggerating the junior’s ability
is by making exaggeration too costly, that is by exerting more effort if s = sm. This
is illustrated in figure 2, which has been drawn for p = 0, h = 1, f = 0.5, η = 0.5,
λ = λB = 1, and Ω = 0.1.
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The figure highlights that the senior’s effort e∗Bdu decreases in β and equals zero for
1 ≥ β > β ≈ 0.28. As a result, the senior’s effort e∗Jdu decreases in β and equals zero
for β = 1.17 For β < β̂ ≈ 0.36, the senior’s effort level e∗Bsm that is optimal from a
productive point of view differs too little from e∗Bdu for the senior not to be tempted
to exaggerate the junior’s ability. The dotted section of the line labelled e∗Bsm indicates
that credible communication is not possible at these effort levels. The bulge-shaped
solid line shows the extent to which the senior has to exert more effort in case her
signal equals s = sm. As a result, the junior also exerts more effort than would be
optimal from a productive point of view.
We now turn to a different element in our model, the factor Ω that appears in the
16One can readily check that for these parameter values the senior ex ante prefers a separating
equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium.
17Moreover, there is a hardly noticeable kink in the graph at β = β.
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Figure 2: Optimal effort levels of senior and junior. Drawn lines satisfy separating
condition, dotted line sections do not (p = 0, h = 1, f = 0.5, η = 0.5, λ = λB = 1, and
Ω = 0.1).
senior’s cost function. This factor could be interpreted as the extent to which the senior
is burdened with other tasks. The larger is Ω, the more time and attention the senior
dedicates to other tasks. An increase in Ω has two effects on the productive effort levels
given by Eq (19). The larger is Ω, the larger are the ‘start up’ costs of exerting any
effort at all. As a consequence, if for a given value of Ω and for a given level of signal
accuracy, the senior does not exert effort in case of s, she does not exert effort either
for higher values of Ω. Secondly, the larger is Ω, the larger are the marginal costs of
exerting effort. This implies that the increase in effort stemming from increasing levels
of signal accuracy goes down as Ω goes up. Because of either reason, the optimal effort
levels of the junior decrease with any increase in Ω.18 An important consequence of all
this is that credible communication becomes more problematic with any increase in Ω,
18For very high values of Ω, the senior may prefer a pooling equilibrium to a separating one.
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as the levels of effort e∗Bsm and e
∗B
du become more and more similar (see Eq (19)). That
is, the more overburdened the senior is by other tasks, the more often the senior has to
deviate from the productive effort levels
(
e∗Bdu , e
∗B
sm
)
so as to convince the junior. This
suggests that an organization that assigns multiple tasks to managers should take into
account not only the costs and benefits of these tasks, but also the effect the workload
of a manager has on her possibilities of revealing valuable information.
6 Attention
In this section we turn to the case where all time spent by the senior amounts to
attention, rather than collaboration, α = 0. Recall that such effort is costly, but does
not directly affect the chances of success of the project. If such effort is of any use in
the present model, it is because of its signalling value.
We continue with the specific case of a linear pi-function and quadratic costs. As the
senior’s temptation is to exaggerate the ability of a junior, the aim is to pay attention
to a junior if one believes he is smart with probability γsm and to ignore the junior in
case of γdu. Let e
∗B
sm be the smallest level of effort, such that the separating condition
1
4h
(p+ h+ γdufAdu)
2 − 1
2
λBΩ
2 >
1
4h
(p+ h+ γdufAsm)
2 − 1
2
λB
(
eBsm + Ω
)2
(20)
is satisfied. Recall that As =
(p+h)γsf
2hλ−γ2sf2 was obtained in Eq (17). Because the senior is
tempted to exaggerate the junior’s ability for β ∈ (0, 1), the senior has to pay attention
in case of s = sm to make her statement credible.
Figure 3 presents the relationship between β and e∗Bsm, with p = 0, h = 1, f = 0.6 and
η = 1
2
. For low levels of β, the benefits of exaggerating the junior’s ability are small.
Little attention, e∗Bsm, is therefore needed to withhold the senior from exaggerating.
With increasing levels of β, the increase in effort exerted by the junior thanks to his
enhanced self confidence goes up. However, increasing values of β reduce the likelihood
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Figure 3: The amount of attention given by the senior in case s = sm (p = 0, h = 1,
f = 0.6 and η = 0.5).
that this additional effort will be beneficial. As a result, with β going up from zero
to one, attention starts out being rare, grows more intense, and then declines again
to virtually disappear in case of flawless information–the most minimalist form of
attention that is given exclusively in case of s = sm suffices to make communication
credible.
7 Concluding Remarks
Sometimes seniors have better information about juniors’ abilities than the juniors
themselves. In those situations it is not always obvious for a senior to share her in-
formation by ordinary talk. We have explained why. When ability and effort are
complements, the senior has an incentive to exaggerate a junior’s ability. The implica-
tion is that the senior’s words do not depend on her perception of the junior’s ability.
As a consequence, her words do not contain information.
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From the signalling literature we know that if talk does not work, then revealing
information may be possible through costly signals. This was the topic of the last part
of our article. We have shown that a smart type senior–i.e., one who has a favourable
impression of the junior–can engage in costly collaboration or attention beyond what a
dumb type of senior (one who has a less favourable impression) would want to mimic.
It is worth mentioning that this result could have been obtained in a model in which
only one task, involving costly effort, has to be performed. Indeed, using such a model,
Hermalin (1998) has shown that by working harder than what would be optimal from
a purely productive point of view, a senior can signal her private information about a
productivity factor.19
The existence of a second task is essential for our result that the senior can prevent
herself from exaggerating the junior’s ability by delegating the implementation decision
only to juniors she deems able. Why does not a senior with a less favourable impression
also delegate the implementation decision to the junior? The reason is that the senior
wants the person who makes the implementation decision to have a correct perception
of the quality of the project. In a separating equilibrium of the model with delegation,
exaggerating a junior’s ability leads to more effort, but also to a distorted implementa-
tion decision. Thus, apart from benefits there are now costs of exaggerating a junior’s
ability. If these costs exceed the benefits, the senior can reveal her information to the
junior.
We have assumed that if the junior possesses the same information as the senior, he
is equally able to take the implementation decision. Thus, in a separating equilibrium
in which delegation only takes place if the senior’s impression is favourable, the junior
takes the same decision as the senior.20 As discussed, our result does not hinge on this
19Benabou and Tirole (2002) also focus on one task.
20In a pooling equilibrium, the senior is a better decision maker. As the senior has superior infor-
mation about the junior’s ability, she can better assess the quality of the project.
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assumption. Our reason for making this assumption was to highlight that there are not
necessarily costs involved in revealing information through delegation.21 Because we
analyse collaboration in a model with two tasks, we can compare its desirability with
that of delegation as a means of communication. As signalling through collaboration is
costly, whereas communication through delegation is not, an implication in our model
is that delegation, if feasible, is superior to communication through attention.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The beliefs of the junior are clearly consistent with the
proposed equilibrium strategies of either type of senior. Given these beliefs, in case of
D = 1, the junior maximizes 1
4h
(p+ h+ pi (e) γsmf)
2− c(e) and so e∗sm satisfies Eq (8)
for s = sm, and the junior implements the project if and only if condition (7) holds.
Similarly, in case of D = 0, e∗du satisfies Eq (8) for s = du. Given this strategy of the
junior, and given that condition (6) holds, the senior’s best reply is D = 1 in case of
s = sm and D = 0 in case of s = du. In the latter case, she decides to implement if
and only if condition (7) is met for s = du. Note that condition (6) says that if s = du
the payoff of not delegating the implementation decision is larger than the payoff of
delegating this decision.
Proof of Lemma 3: To show part (i), use the first order condition for a maximum
in eJs to obtain
deJs
[
RJJ
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)
− c′′
(
eJs
)]
+ deBs
[
RJB
(
eJs , e
B
s ; s
)]
= 0 (A. 1)
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The first expression in square brackets is negative by the second order condition. The
second term in square brackets is positive by our assumption that piJB ≥ 0. Hence,
deJs /de
B
s > 0 on the best reply function. Part (ii) follows immediately as for any level
of effort exerted by the senior, the marginal productivity increases if the junior believes
the senior’s level of effort signals s = sm rather than s = du. QED
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose e∗Bsm > 0. If e
∗B
du = 0, we’re done. So, assume e
∗B
du > 0.
Eq (14) now holds for both types of seniors. The partial derivatives RB and RJ are
increasing in γs. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that de
J
s /de
B
s also increases
in γs. Formally,
deJs
deBs
= − RJB
RJJ − c′′ (A. 2)
Therefore
∂ de
J
s
deBs
∂γs
= −
∂RJB
∂γs
(RJJ − c′′)− ∂RJJ∂γs RJB
(RJJ − c′′)2
(A. 3)
Furthermore
∂RJB
∂γs
=
γsf
h
piBpiJ +
(p+ h) f
2h
piJB +
γspif
2
h
piJB > 0
∂RJJ
∂γs
=
γsf
2
h
piJpiJ +
(p+ h) f
2h
piJJ +
γspif
2
h
piJJ
As RJJ − c′′ < 0 by the second order condition for a maximum, and ∂RJB/∂γs > 0,
the derivative in equation (A. 3) is positive if piJJ is not too negative. QED
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